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Non-technical summary 
 
This study examines in detail the capital policy of banks with rather peculiar 
characteristics. German savings banks are public corporations, whose access to the 
capital market is strongly restricted. Therefore, they heavily rely on retained earnings. 
One of the very few alternatives to increase their capital ratio, besides retaining profits, 
is to issue subordinated debt. 
We find that 47 percent of all surveyed savings banks target a quantitative capital 
ratio. Interestingly, these savings banks target both lower and higher capital marks, 
whereas other savings banks with a qualitative capital target only wish to increase or 
maintain the capital ratio, but not to reduce it. Since their capitalisation does not differ 
significantly, we conclude that these banks, aiming at a quantitative capital ratio, have 
a more complex capital management. In support of this finding we obtain evidence 
that these savings banks, having a quantitative capital target, are more likely to choose 
a more complex Basel II approach. However, also larger savings banks prefer more 
complicated Basel II approaches. These savings banks are more likely to have the 
willingness and abilities to apply more sophisticated approaches. 
The savings banks’ target capital ratio is determined particularly by the savings 
banks’ willingness to take risk, their desired credit growth and their profitability. For 
reaching the target capital ratio, instruments that manipulate the level of capital are 
preferred over instruments that change the level of risk-weighted assets. The most 
important instruments are lowering costs and issuing subordinated debt. We find that 
the issuance of subordinated debt is significantly more important for savings banks 
with a low regulatory capital ratio. For these banks issuing subordinated debt is even 
the most important instrument to raise capital. 
After examining the issuance of subordinated debt in more detail, we ascertain that 
the most important motivation to issue subordinated debt is to increase the so-called 
Tier 2 capital. The case is especially true for savings banks with a low Tier 1 capital 
endowment. Preserving low interest rates on the capital market is another important 
motivation to issue subordinated debt.  
About 60 percent of all surveyed savings banks plan to apply the simplest, i.e. the 
standardised approach under Basel II, whereas about 40 percent will apply the IRB 
foundation approach. However, the consequences of Basel II on the capital ratio are 
limited. Independent of the selected approach, the majority of savings banks in both 
groups will not increase capital due to the new capital agreement. Furthermore, the 
abolishment of the owner’s statutory obligation regarding all third party liabilities of 
the savings banks will affect the savings banks’ capital endowment only moderately. 
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Abstract 
In contrast to earlier field studies, we survey German public savings banks on their 
management of capital. We find that the most important determinants of the savings 
banks’ target capital ratio are risk aversion, the desired credit growth and profitability. 
Savings banks prefer to manage the level of capital rather than the level of risk-
weighted assets in order to reach their target capital ratio. The most important 
instruments to increase the level of capital are lowering costs and issuing subordinated 
debt. We obtain strong evidence that issuing subordinated debt is a particularly 
important instrument to increase capital for less capitalised savings banks. 
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1 Introduction 
Ever since Modigliani and Miller (1958) proved in their path-breaking paper that 
capital policy is irrelevant in perfect markets, a significant amount of literature has 
examined how the optimal capital policy should look, if the unrealistic assumption of 
perfect markets is eliminated. However, despite much effort, there is little consensus 
on how firms choose their capital structure. According to Miller (1988) and Myers 
(2001), we are still lacking a comprehensive explanation for firms’ capital policy. 
So far, most of the studies have focused on the non-financial corporations with the 
legal form of joint-stock companies. Financial firms usually were neglected, since 
their capital ratios are subject to strict legal regulation and consequently differ from 
those of non-financial firms.1 This paper enriches existing literature by focusing on 
financial firms. Restricting the analysis to financial firms only may offer a deeper 
insight into the motivation behind the capital policy than examining a heterogeneous 
sample of all non-financial firms. We focus on German savings banks, which are 
expected to be particularly homogenous, since they are characterised by unique 
institutional settings. They are the only banking group worldwide, which is made up of 
public institutions. Due to their special characteristics, capital policy may be different 
for these banks. 
Due to their public ownership, their business is restricted by law in many ways. 
Consequently, savings banks are financially less flexible. Most obvious is, for 
instance, the fact that German savings banks cannot increase equity capital by issuing 
stocks. Therefore, they might rely on retained profits to a greater extent than joint-
stock companies. One of the few alternatives to increase capital is to issue 
subordinated debt or other hybrid capital. The pecking order theory of Myers and 
Majluf (1984), therefore, may not be applicable. It claims that there is a hierarchy of 
funding sources, which ranges from the most preferred retained profits to the issuance 
of equity capital.2 But in accordance with Orgler and Taggart (1983) and Diamond and 
Rajan (2000), for instance, the traditional trade-off theory may also hold for savings 
banks. According to the trade-off theory, savings banks target an optimal capital ratio, 
which balances the utility and costs of issuing debt. Savings banks might have to plan 
their capital endowment more precisely than other firms, since they have no possibility 
to receive capital from a parent company or hardly can receive funds from the highly 
indebted local authorities, who represent their responsible bodies.  
In the following, we thus examine whether savings banks target a quantitative 
capital ratio. Alternatively, changes in the capital ratio might reflect rather random 
changes in annual profits and changes in credit growth. In the next step we thus inspect 
to what extent profitability and credit growth − besides other factors − influence the 
savings banks’ determination of their target capital ratios. Furthermore, as savings 
banks only have a limited choice of instruments to manage their capital ratio, we also 
analyse, which instruments are of greatest importance to achieving the target capital 
                                                 
1  See e.g. Rajan/Zingales (1995). 
2  See e.g. Shyam-Sunder et al. (1998) and Fama/French (2002) for an empirical verification of the trade-off 
and pecking order theory. 
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ratio. Since subordinated debt seems to be of high importance for the savings banks, 
we discuss the motivation to issue subordinated debt in more detail. Finally, the 
expected effects of the abolition of the owner’s statutory obligation and of the new 
Basel Accord on the savings banks’ capital policy are also examined. 
Since databases could only partly answer these questions and are of little help in 
examining the motivation behind the savings banks’ capital policy, we survey the 
banks directly. A series of surveys on the capital policy of non-financial corporations 
by Pinegar and Wilbricht (1986), Graham and Harvey (2001), Bancel and Mittoo 
(2002) and Brounen et al. (2004) has already demonstrated the efficiency of this 
methodology. A more related survey by Marques and Santos (2004) even refers 
explicitly to the capital policy of banks. But in contrast to our survey, it focuses on 
Portuguese banks in the legal form of joint-stock companies. As far as we know, this 
paper is the first to survey German public savings banks regarding their capital policy.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology of the 
survey. Section 3 introduces the results by presenting some descriptive statistics, and 
Section 4 provides the main results regarding the savings banks’ management of 
capital. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Methodology 
2.1 Design 
The questionnaire comprises two sections. The first section surveys important key 
characteristics of the participating savings banks. The aim of this section is to 
differentiate the results from the second section according to these key characteristics. 
We positioned this part at the beginning of the questionnaire, since these questions are 
most easily answered and might motivate responses on the following questions as 
well. Indeed, all surveyed savings banks answered both the first and the second section 
of the questionnaire. The second part comprises the questions regarding the savings 
banks’ capital policy. Based on recent literature on the capital policy of non-bank 
companies, we adapted the questionnaire to the special characteristics of the German 
savings banks sector.  
We conducted beta tests at two savings banks, incorporated their suggestions and 
revised the survey. On October 6, 2004, we sent the questionnaires to all public 
savings banks by regular mail and asked for reply by fax or regular mail. We directed 
the questionnaire to the CEOs of the savings banks and requested a forwarding of the 
questionnaire to the relevant specialist department if necessary. On November 26, 
2004, we reminded the savings banks that had neither yet answered nor indicated that 
they did not wish to participate in the survey. Finally, we received 87 completed 
questionnaires − a response rate of 18.5 percent. It is comfortably higher than the 
response rate obtained by Brounen et al (5%), Graham and Harvey (9%) or Trahan and 
Gritman (12%).  
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2.2 Statistical tests 
We sorted the responses according to the specific characteristics of the savings banks 
and applied statistical tests, in order to examine whether some groups of savings banks 
differ significantly in their behaviour. Since the assumption of normally distributed 
data was refused, we focused on nonparametric tests. The Pearson’s χ2 independence 
test, which tests for the statistical independence of categorical variables, is the most 
general test in this context. However, this test is less appropriate for analysing a 
potential relationship between two ordinal variables in small samples. Therefore, we 
focused on Spearman’s correlation whenever possible. Based on ranks, it measures the 
correlation between two ordinal variables similar to the correlation coefficient for 
continuous variables. In each case, we report both the correlation itself and its level of 
significance (p-value). 
3 Descriptive statistics 
We focused our survey on public savings banks, since the seven free savings banks3 in 
Germany could manage capital differently. Many of them are in the legal form of 
joint-stock companies and are expected to have much better access to capital than 
public savings banks. At the time the survey was conducted, 471 public savings banks 
existed.  
 
Table 1: Overview of participation by the federal states
Federal state Number of Expected dis- Responses Sample dis- Response ratio
sav. banks tribution (%) tribution (%) by state (%)
North Rhine-Westphalia 114 0.24 23 0.26 0.20
Baden-Wuerttemberg 57 0.12 13 0.15 0.23
Hesse 34 0.07 12 0.14 0.35
Bavaria 82 0.17 12 0.14 0.15
Schleswig-Holstein 18 0.04 9 0.10 0.50
Lower Saxony 50 0.11 5 0.06 0.10
Rhineland-Palatinate 27 0.06 3 0.03 0.11
Thuringia 16 0.03 3 0.03 0.19
Saxony 18 0.04 3 0.03 0.17
Saxony-Anhalt 22 0.05 1 0.01 0.05
Brandenburg 12 0.03 1 0.01 0.08
Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania 13 0.03 2 0.02 0.15
Saarland 7 0.01 0 0.00 0.00
Bremen 1 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Total 471 1.00 87 1.00 0.18  
Note: The second column refers to the total number of savings banks per federal state at the time the 
survey was conducted. The third column is calculated by dividing the number of savings banks per 
federal state by the total of all savings banks. The fourth column gives the number of the returned 
questionnaires per federal state and the fifth column is calculated by dividing the number of received 
questionnaires per federal state by the total number of all received questionnaires. The last column 
finally gives the share of received answers compared to the actual number of banks in the given state. 
                                                 
3  Free savings banks do not belong to a specific local authority like the overwhelming majority of public 
savings banks. Some of the free savings banks are joint-stock companies. 
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Table 1 shows both the number of savings banks in each federal state that could 
potentially have participated in the survey and the number of savings banks which in 
fact have responded. On the basis of these numbers, we calculated the individual 
response ratios per federal state. Furthermore, we present the data relative to the total 
number of all savings banks (Expected distribution) and of all respondent savings 
banks (Sample distribution), respectively. According to Table 1, savings banks of 
nearly all German federal states participated in the survey. We did not receive any 
answers from the very small federal state of Bremen (1 savings bank) and Saarland (7 
savings banks). The response ratio by federal state is particularly high in Schleswig-
Holstein, Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Thuringia and North Rhine-Westphalia. In 
these federal states, the individual response ratio is larger than the sample response 
ratio of 18.5 percent. Differentiating between Western and Eastern Germany, we find 
that the response ratio is smaller in Eastern Germany (12.3 percent) than in Western 
Germany (19.7 percent). However, the varying response rates among the federal states 
do not have a significant effect on the results of this paper. We sorted the results 
according to the varying federal states but did not find any remarkable variations. 
Therefore, our results generally refer to the total sample of all federal states. 
In the next step, we tested for a potential response bias. It could be argued, for 
instance, that only large and/or strongly capitalised banks participated in the survey. 
As a consequence, our conclusions drawn from the polled savings banks might not 
hold for the total sample of all savings banks. Therefore, we compared the 
characteristics of the polled savings banks with those that did not participate in the 
survey. In the first step, we examined whether there might be a response bias regarding 
the size of the savings banks. Therefore, we constructed four size classes and 
categorised the savings banks. The thresholds of 0.7, 1.3 and 2.3 billion euro in total 
assets represent the quartiles of the size distribution of all German savings banks, 
according to the savings banks’ national association (DSGV, 2005a), by the end of 
2003. As a consequence, we expected that the sample of participating savings banks is 
equally distributed among these classes. In fact, we find that the survey is slightly 
biased towards larger savings banks. We received 37 percent of all replies by banks 
smaller than the median of all German savings banks and 63 percent by larger savings 
banks. Since there are three types of savings banks, which typically differ in size, we 
examined whether the participation by the three different types of savings banks could 
explain the small bias. There are savings banks related to a city (Stadtsparkassen), 
which are typically smaller in size, since they conduct their business exclusively in the 
urban area. In contrast, Kreissparkassen typically are larger in size, since they conduct 
their business in the whole district. Finally, Zweckverbandssparkassen are related to an 
association of cities and/or districts. Consequently, they are, on average, larger than 
the other types of savings banks. As shown in Table 2, the size index significantly 
differs between the different types of savings banks according to Pearson’s chi2 
independence test and ranges from 2.5 for Stadtsparkassen to 3.1 for 
Zweckverbandssparkassen. The mean of the size index represents the mean of the 
distribution over the four size classes. A mean of 1 (4) would indicate that all 
considered savings banks belong to the smallest (largest) size class.  
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Indeed, we find that the fraction of large Zweckverbandssparkassen in our sample is 
slightly higher than expected. However, the fraction of small Stadtsparkassen in our 
sample is also somewhat higher than expected. According to the DSGV (2005b), 23 
(48) percent of all public savings banks were Stadtsparkassen 
(Zweckverbandssparkassen) at the end of 2003. In total, the distribution among the 
different types of savings banks in our sample is more or less similar to the distribution 
among all German savings banks. Therefore, the distribution of the participating 
savings banks among the different types of savings banks cannot explain the small bias 
towards larger savings banks. Thus, we argue that larger savings banks had more 
personnel resources to participate in our survey than smaller ones. 
 
Table 2: Representativeness of the sample
Total assets (end of 2003) in bill. euro Sample (%) Real (%)
[0; 0.7[ 0.13 0.25
[0.7; 1.3[ 0.24 0.25
[1.3; 2.3[ 0.22 0.25
[2.3; 100[ 0.41 0.25
N=86 1.00 1.00
Type of savings bank Sample (%) Real (%)
Stadtsparkasse 0.26 0.23
Kreissparkasse 0.23 0.28
Gemeinde/Amtssparkasse 0.00 0.01
Zweckverbandssparkasse 0.51 0.48
N=87 1.00 1.00
Mean of 
Type of savings bank N size index
Stadtsparkasse 23 2.5
Kreissparkasse 20 2.9
Zweckverbandssparkasse 43 3.1
Chi2 independence test [P-value] [0.041]  
Note: The mean of size index reflects the mean size class of the relevant subsample. It is 1 if all 
responding savings banks have total assets less than 0.7 billion euro and it is 4, if all participating 
savings banks have total assets larger than 2.3 billion euro. Gemeinde/Amtssparkassen are savings 
banks, which refer to smaller villages. 
 
Table 3 examines the savings banks’ capitalisation in greater detail. According to 
the declaration by the DSGV (2004), savings banks had, on average, a total capital 
ratio (Tier 1 and Tier 2) of 11.5 % and a Tier 1 capital ratio of 7.4 % at the end of 
2003. These figures served as a basis for defining the different capitalisation classes in 
our survey. We find that 46 % (54%) of all participating savings banks had a total 
capital ratio of less (more) than 11.5 % at the end of 2003. These figures indicate that 
the threshold of 11.5% is suitable in order to differentiate between savings banks with 
lower and higher levels of capitalisation. As far as the Tier 1 ratio is concerned, we 
find that 39% (61%) of all savings banks in our sample have a Tier 1 capital ratio of 
below (more than) 7.0 percent. 
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It could be argued, that smaller savings banks have more difficulties in increasing 
capital than larger savings banks, because small banks cannot exploit economies of 
scale, and issuing subordinated debt might be too expensive for them. Therefore, 
smaller savings banks might be less capitalised. In line with Werner and Padberg 
(1998), however, the Spearman’s rank correlation does not indicate any significant 
correlation between the savings banks’ size and capitalisation. Furthermore, we 
examined the relationship between capitalisation and the existence of outstanding 
subordinated debt more closely.4 In line with the findings by Ito and Sasaki (1998) for 
Japanese banks, we obtain evidence that better capitalised savings banks resort to 
issuing subordinated debt to a significantly smaller extent. In other words, savings 
banks, which have issued subordinated debt, are significantly less capitalised than 
other savings banks. Therefore, we find first evidence that outstanding subordinated 
debt might be a signal that these savings banks have difficulties in increasing capital.  
 
Table 3: Capitalisation, size and subordinated debt
Total regulatory capital Mean of Fraction of sav.banks
ratio (end of 2003) N % size index with subord. debt (%)
[0 %;  9.5 %[ 5 0.06 1.80 0.60
[9.5 %;  11.5 %[ 35 0.41 2.97 0.91
[11.5 %; 13,5 %[ 30 0.35 2.90 0.60
[13.5 %; 100 %[ 16 0.19 3.13 0.56
Spearman's correlation 0.118 0.274
[P-value] [0.281] [0.011]
Tier 1 capital ratio Mean of Fraction of sav.banks
(end of 2003) N % size index with subord. debt (%)
[0 %; 7.0 %[ 32 0.39 3.09 0.94
[7.0 %; 100 %[ 52 0.61 2.79 0.58
Spearman's correlation -0.1545 0.388
[P-value] [0.161] [0.000]
Mean of Mean of cap-
Outstanding subordinated debt N % size index italisation index
Yes 62 0.72 3.02 2.53
No 24 0.28 2.63 3.00
Spearman's correlation -0.161 0.274
[P-value] [0.138] [0.011]  
Note: The mean of the capitalisation index reflects the mean capitalisation class of the relevant 
subsample of savings banks. It equals 1 if all responding savings banks have a total capital ratio 
smaller than 9.5 percent of risk-weighted assets, and it is 4 if all participating savings banks have a 
total capital ratio larger than 13.5 percent of risk-weighted assets. 
 
Table 4 shows some further descriptive statistics, which will be helpful in 
differentiating the analysis. The capital management of savings banks might be 
influenced by the intended selection among the three approaches to calculate minimum 
                                                 
4  According to Table 3, only 28 percent of all savings banks have not issued subordinated debt. 
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capital requirements under the new Basel II capital accord. In the new capital 
framework, which will become effective at the end of 2006,5 savings banks can choose 
from several approaches, which increase in complexity: the standardised approach, the 
IRB foundation, and the IRB advanced approach. We find that 60 percent of all 
surveyed savings banks intend to implement the standardised Basel approach. 39 
percent of them want to use the IRB foundation approach, and 1 percent the IRB 
advanced approach. The intended selection of the Basel II approach clearly depends on 
the size of the savings bank. Smaller savings banks prefer the simple standardised 
approach, while larger savings banks prefer the IRB foundation approach or even the 
IRB advanced approach. Spearman’s correlation indicates a highly significant 
correlation between size and the selection of the Basel II approach. 
Furthermore, about every fourth savings bank in our sample is a so-called 
Handelsbuchinstitut. These are savings banks, which hold a nontrivial amount of 
securities primarily for trading purposes. Managing of capital might differ for 
Handelsbuchinstitute, since they bear a higher market risk than other savings banks. 
We find that Handelsbuchinstitute are significantly larger than other savings banks. 
Probably professional trading by savings banks needs a certain infrastructure, which is 
only available in larger savings banks. However, we do not find that 
Handelsbuchinstitute are significantly better capitalised or have issued significantly 
more subordinated debt than other savings banks. 
 
Table 4: Other characteristics
Mean of Mean of capit- Fraction of Handels-
Intended Basle II approach N % size index alisation index buchinstitute (%)
Standardised approach 50 0.60 2.68 2.64 0.24
IRB-foundation approach 32 0.39 3.19 2.66 0.30
IRB advanced approach 1 0.01 4.00 3.00 0.00
Spearman's correlation 0.242 0.020 -0.054
[P-value] [0.028] [0.856] [0.628]
Mean of Mean of capit- Fraction of sav.banks
Handelsbuchinstitut N % size index alisation index with subord. debt (%)
Yes 23 0.27 3.78 2.91 0.83
No 63 0.73 2.59 2.57 0.69
Spearman's correlation -0.502 -0.163 0.137
[P-value] [0.000] [0.135] [0.207]
Desired credit growth Mean of Mean of capit- Fraction of sav.banks
above average N % size index alisation index with subord. debt (%)
Yes 10 0.12 2.50 2.70 0.90
No 76 0.88 2.96 2.66 0.70
Spearman's correlation 0.132 -0.005 0.142
[P-value] [0.225] [0.960] [0.190]  
 
                                                 
5  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), Tz. 2. 
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Finally we asked the savings banks whether they follow an above average credit 
growth. An above average credit growth could require a higher capitalisation, e.g. by 
issuing subordinated debt in order to fund the higher credit growth. Interestingly, only 
12 percent of the surveyed savings banks stated that they aim for an above average 
credit growth, although we might have expected a ratio of 50 percent. However, we 
could not find any significant relationship between the desired credit growth and the 
savings banks’ capitalisation or issuance of subordinated debt. 
As mentioned before, economies of scale may exist that could have some influence 
on the savings banks’ profitability and capitalisation. For instance, the diversification 
of the savings banks’ credit portfolio might depend on the savings banks’ size. The 
larger the bank, the more likely it is to have borrowers from a greater variety of 
industries. In addition, savings banks might use economies of scale in monitoring the 
borrowers. In fact, the surveyed savings banks confirm that larger savings banks have 
some advantages regarding the credit diversification and the monitoring of borrowers. 
The relevant index means, which could range from 1 (does not apply at all) to 5 
(completely true), are 3.49 and 2.65, respectively. In order to detect potential varying 
assessments by the savings banks, we classified the results according to the size of the 
savings banks. As far as the diversification of the credit portfolio is concerned, we 
could not find any significant difference in the judgement by small and large savings 
banks. But the relevance of economies of scale in the monitoring of credits is 
significantly different for both groups. From the point of view of large savings banks, 
there are significantly stronger economies of scale in the monitoring of borrowers than 
from that of small savings banks. This result could indicate that small savings bank 
underestimate the economies of scale in the monitoring of borrowers. 
  
 
Table 5: Economies of scale
Index Index Index Sp.'s
N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-value]
Economies of scale in the 
diversification of the credit portfolio 87 3.49 52 3.44 35 3.57 0.029 [0.793]
Economies of scale in the 
monitoring of credits 86 2.65 51 2.41 35 3.00 0.257 [0.017]
Total assets
<2.3 bill. €
Total assets
>=2.3 bill. €
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4 Capital management of savings banks 
4.1 Do savings banks have a quantitative capital target? 
According to the trade-off theory of capital, an optimal capital ratio exists that 
balances the expenses and the utility of debt and thus minimises funding costs.6 On the 
one hand, debt is tax-deductible and thus might have a decisive advantage in contrast 
to equity capital, which has to be accumulated from profits. Furthermore, savings 
banks can resort to savings deposits to a great deal, which are low interest-bearing and 
increase the attractiveness of debt.7 On the other hand, banking regulation forces the 
savings banks to hold a minimum amount of regulatory capital. Overall, savings banks 
thus might hold a specific regulatory capital ratio weighing the risk of falling below 
the regulatory minimum and the attractiveness of debt. Therefore, the trade-off theory 
should be of relevance for the German savings banks as well. Marques and Santos 
(2004) find that the trade-off theory is the most relevant theory for Portuguese banks. 
According to Table 6, 46 percent of all German public savings banks confirmed that 
they target a quantitative mark for the regulatory capital ratio, which would be in line 
with the trade-off theory. According to these banks, they need one to seven years to 
reach this quantitative capital target, if they have not yet reached it. The other savings 
banks do not target a specific quantitative capital ratio, but claim to manage the ratio 
qualitatively; that means that they wish to increase, decrease or keep the current capital 
ratio. Interestingly, we find remarkable differences between both groups of savings 
banks regarding the direction of desired changes in the capital ratio. There is a large 
number of savings banks which have a quantitative capital ratio and want to reduce the 
capital ratio, but there is not a single savings bank with a qualitative capital target that 
aims at a lower capital ratio. Therefore, the chi2 independence test refuses the 
hypotheses that the existence of a quantitative target for the total capital ratio and the 
desired changes in the capital ratio are statistically independent. However, Spearman’s 
rho does not indicate a significant correlation between both variables. 
We examined whether the targeting of the capital ratio depends on various factors. 
First, we analysed whether the savings bank’s decision to target a quantitative capital 
ratio depends on its size. The larger the bank, the better the planning might be. 
Therefore, we expected that particularly larger savings banks tend to manage their 
capital ratio quantitatively. However, we found no significant relationship between 
size and the existence of a quantitative target capital ratio. Second, we assumed that 
better capitalised savings banks may have a better capital planning and therefore tend 
to have a quantitative target capital ratio. But we also found no evidence for this 
assumption. Third, Handelsbuchinstitute could rely on capital planning more heavily, 
since they have to bear considerably more market risk than other banks, which might 
require a more sophisticated capital planning. Again, we found no significant 
relationship. Finally, we examined whether the savings banks’ prospective selection of 
the Basel II approach might allow some conclusions regarding their capital planning. 
                                                 
6  See e.g. Myers (1984). 
7  See Miller (1995). 
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We expected that the savings banks, which intend to apply a more sophisticated Basel 
II approach, also may have a more sophisticated capital planning. In fact, we found 
that savings banks intending to use a more sophisticated Basel II approach 
significantly prefer to target a quantitative capital ratio.  
 
Table 6: Quantitative capital target
Lowering Keeping Increasing
Existence of a quantitative Mean of Mean ot total total capital total capital total capital
target for the total capital ratio N % size index capital index N ratio (%) ratio (%) ratio (%)
Yes 40 0.47 2.95 2.65 35 0.40 0.20 0.40
No 46 0.53 2.85 2.70 24 0.00 0.38 0.63
Spearman's correlation -0.059 0.020
[P-value] [0.594] [0.856]
Chi2 independence test [P-value]
IRB IRB
N % Yes (%) No (%) N Stand. (%) found.(%) adv. (%)
Quantitative capital target 40 0.47 0.30 0.70 40 0.45 0.53 0.03
No quantitative capital target 46 0.53 0.22 0.78 43 0.74 0.26 0.00
Spearman's correlation
[P-value]
-0.069
Intended Basel II approach
0.094 -0.306
[0.602]
[0.387] [0.005]
[0.002]
Handelsbuchinstitut
 
 
4.2 Determinants of the target capital ratio 
As mentioned above, many savings banks do target a certain quantitative capital ratio. 
Others have an unspecific qualitative target. However, it is unclear so far, how this 
quantitative or qualitative target is determined. Table 7 gives an overview of the 
potential determinants on the savings banks’ target capital ratio, ranked according to 
their relevance for the savings banks.8 On the right side of the Table the means for 
savings banks with a Tier 1 capital ratio below and above 7 percent are presented. The 
Spearman’s correlation index indicates whether the importance of the determinants 
differs significantly between both subsamples. 
We found that the three most important factors driving the savings banks’ target 
capital ratio is the willingness to take risk, the target credit growth, and the current 
profitability. The closer the capital ratio is to the regulatory minimum, the higher is the 
risk of falling below the regulatory minimum. Therefore, savings banks with a greater 
willingness to take risk may choose a smaller capital ratio than other banks that prefer 
a higher amount of excess capital above the regulatory minimum. Since the expected 
volatility of the capital ratio might also have an influence on the risk of falling below 
the regulatory minimum, this variable is of some relevance as well.9 Besides the 
willingness to take risk, the desired credit growth is also of high importance. The 
                                                 
8  It should be noted that the ranking is based on means, which could, as an exemption, range between 1 and 4 
instead of 1 and 5, since there are only four potential answers possible for the relevant question. 
9  See Grimmer (2003), pp. 249-250. 
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higher the desired credit growth, the larger is the target regulatory capital ratio, since 
the latter will be decreased by extending credit lending. The desired credit growth 
might be of greater importance for the target capital ratio, especially for savings banks, 
which already have a rather small capital ratio, since the financial scope to extend 
credit growth is smaller for these banks. Indeed, Spearman’s correlation indicates that 
this variable is of a significantly higher importance to savings banks with a Tier 1 ratio 
below 7 percent. For these savings banks, desired credit growth is even more 
important than the willingness to take risk. Interestingly, we find some evidence that 
the desired credit growth is less relevant for savings banks aiming at an above average 
credit growth. These banks probably would not desire a credit growth above average, 
if they had not the financial scope to increase credit growth without considerably 
increasing the capital ratio. 
Not surprisingly, profitability is an important driver of the target capital ratio as 
well. The higher the profitability, the more profits can be retained and the more the 
capital ratio can be raised. Not only the current profitability, but also the future 
profitability is of high relevance. A positive outlook for future profitability makes the 
savings banks increase their target capital ratio. That means that savings banks do not 
get tired of increasing capital even in case of higher future profitability.  
Portfolio risk also has some relevance for the target capital ratio. The higher the 
portfolio risk, the lower the regulatory capital ratio is and the higher the risk of going 
bankrupt is. In order to maintain the previous capital ratio, savings banks target a 
higher capital ratio when portfolio risk increases.  
Interestingly, some financial ratios like the return on equity (ROE) and the cost-
income ratio also have an influence on the target capital ratio. Since, the higher the 
ROE, the more attractive equity capital is, savings banks with a higher ROE aim at a 
larger capital ratio. Furthermore, costs of issuing subordinated debt play a certain role 
in the planning of the capital ratio as well.10 The higher the costs of issuing 
subordinated debt, the more difficult it is to raise the capital ratio via this instrument. 
Therefore, higher costs of issuing subordinated debt decrease the financial flexibility 
of savings banks and result in a lower target capital ratio. Not surprisingly, we find 
that the relevance of this variable for the capital ratio depends significantly on the fact 
whether the savings bank has issued subordinated debt or not. Spearman’s correlation 
indicates that the costs of issuing subordinated debt are significantly more relevant for 
the savings banks that actually have issued subordinated debt. Only these banks might 
assess the relevance of the costs properly.  
 
                                                 
10  See Grimmer (2003), pp. 249-250. 
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Table 7: Determinants of the capital ratio
Index Index Index Sp.'s
Potential determinants of the capital ratio N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-val.]
Willingness to take risk 83 3.46 30 3.50 50 3.42 -0.029 [0.801]
Desired credit growth 84 3.33 30 3.60 51 3.20 -0.249 [0.025]
Current profitability 84 3.13 30 3.07 51 3.12 0.035 [0.756]
Expected profitability 84 3.04 30 3.13 51 2.94 -0.083 [0.464]
Portfolio risk 81 2.90 29 3.00 49 2.80 -0.093 [0.420]
ROE 81 2.65 30 2.70 48 2.54 -0.062 [0.588]
Cost-Income Ratio 83 2.47 30 2.67 51 2.29 -0.159 [0.155]
Costs of issuing subordinated debt 82 2.46 30 2.70 49 2.37 -0.155 [0.172]
Expected volatility of the total capital ratio 81 2.46 30 2.63 49 2.31 -0.152 [0.182]
Diversification of the credit portfolio 82 2.43 30 2.57 49 2.29 -0.120 [0.294]
Economic situation 84 2.36 30 2.43 51 2.25 -0.075 [0.509]
Unidentified loss reserves 83 1.88 30 2.07 50 1.72 -0.146 [0.196]
Fiscal disadvantage of equity capital vs debt 81 1.80 30 1.87 48 1.73 -0.040 [0.729]
Excess capital ratio of neighbouring savings banks 81 1.68 29 1.66 49 1.67 0.034 [0.770]
Size (Total assets) 84 1.65 30 1.80 51 1.57 -0.087 [0.438]
Index Index Index Sp.'s
Potential determinants of capital ratio N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-val.]
Desired credit growth 84 3.33 10 3.00 74 3.38 0.192 [0.081]
Index Index Index Sp.'s
Potential determinants of capital ratio N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-val.]
Costs of issuing subordinated debt 82 2.46 61 2.74 21 1.67 -0.417 [0.000]
Index Index Index Sp.'s
Potential determinants of capital ratio N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-val.]
Diversification of the credit portfolio 82 2.43 49 2.35 33 2.55 0.092 [0.411]
Tier1<7% Tier1>=7%
High credit Low credit
growth growth
Subord. No subord.
debt issued debt issued
Small banks Large banks
(TA<2.3 bill.€) (TA >=2.3 bill.€)
 
 
The lower the diversification of the credit portfolio, the higher the target capital 
ratio of the surveyed savings banks is. Interestingly, this relationship holds, although 
the savings banks are not forced to do so by regulation. Since larger banks do have a 
certain advantage in the diversification of the credit portfolio (see Table 5), we 
assumed that the assessment of the relevance of this variable could depend on the 
bank’s size. However, we do not find any significant differences.  
The current economic situation has a positive impact on the target capital ratio.11 
Savings banks might target a higher capital ratio when the economic situation 
improves, since credit demand will rise. Assuming that the savings banks will satisfy 
                                                 
11  Ayuso et al. (2004), however, find a significant and negative relationship between the economic situation 
and the regulatory capital ratio. Some banks could indeed aim at a larger regulatory capital ratio in an 
economic upswing but could accept that the larger credit supply finally lowers the regulatory capital ratio. 
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the increased credit demand, they would consequently need a larger regulatory capital 
ratio.12 
The higher the unidentified credit reserves, the higher the target capital ratio is. 
Savings banks, which have to increase their unidentified credit reserves, might be in a 
worse financial situation than other banks and may try to increase the capital ratio as 
an additional buffer against unexpected credit losses. Furthermore, the larger the fiscal 
disadvantage of equity capital versus debt, the smaller the target capital ratio is. But 
the low index mean of 1.80 indicates that overall tax considerations do play a minor 
role in the planning of the capital ratio.13 The (voluntary) high tax payments of the 
savings banks compared with other banks would leave tax minimisation efforts by the 
banks implausible anyway.14 Since the argumentation of the trade-off theory usually is 
based on these tax considerations, we obtain little support for the relevance of the 
theory here. Nevertheless, the theory is not generally put into question, since funding 
with the help of low interest-bearing deposits is very attractive for savings banks 
irrespective of tax considerations. 
The excess capital ratio of other savings banks in the neighbourhood has only a 
marginal effect on the target capital ratio. Savings banks hardly consider neighbouring 
savings banks as competitors, since in general the savings banks’ business areas do not 
overlap due to the laws of the individual federal states (Regionalprinzip).  
As far as size is concerned, the theoretical effect on the target capital ratio is not 
clear. On the one hand, larger savings banks can issue subordinated debt at lower costs 
than smaller savings banks and therefore might aim at higher target capital ratios. On 
the other hand, larger savings banks might benefit from some advantages in the 
diversification of the credit portfolio and thus may target a lower capital ratio. 
However, since the savings banks claim a meagre positive relationship between size 
and the target capital ratio, the diversification effect seems to be of little relevance. 
The Wilcoxon rank sum test indicates at least that the mean of 1.65 is significantly 
different from 1.00 on a one percent level. 
4.3 How do savings banks change their capital ratio? 
We also surveyed the German savings banks about what instruments were most 
important to manage their capital ratio. In general, savings banks can change their 
regulatory capital ratio towards their target capital ratio by changing the level of 
capital or changing the level of risk-weighted assets. In order to increase the regulatory 
capital ratio, for instance, savings banks can increase the level of capital and/or 
decrease the level of risk-weighted assets. But the number of instruments to increase 
capital or decrease risk-weighted assets is limited. Table 8 summarises the importance 
of several instruments to manage the capital ratio. 
                                                 
12  See Deutsche Bundesbank (2005a) for the relationship between the economic development, the credit supply 
and the regulatory capital endowment of savings banks. 
13  Grimmer (2003) determines that the tax advantage only has a minor importance when savings banks 
determine their target capital ratio. 
14  See Mauerer (1998) and Gerlach/Gondrich (1994). 
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We find that savings banks favour the instruments that manipulate the level of 
capital, whereas the instruments manipulating the risk-weighted assets are of less 
importance. A potential reason is the fact that savings banks are responsible for the 
loan supply of their region due to the public mandate. Therefore, savings banks could 
face limitations in decreasing their credit supply in order to reduce their risk-weighted 
assets. In that regard, their credit supply could be less pro-cyclical compared to other 
banks.15 
The most preferred instruments for raising the capital ratio are lowering of costs and 
issuance of subordinated debt. We find that savings banks with a Tier 1 capital ratio 
below 7 percent even prefer issuing subordinated debt to lowering costs. Probably 
lowering costs might take too long a time for these less capitalised banks until 
profitability and the capital ratio increase. Spearman’s correlation indicates that 
issuing subordinated debt is significantly more important for savings banks with a Tier 
1 capital below 7 percent than for the banks with a higher ratio. These banks are 
expected to rely particularly on external capital to increase the total capital ratio. 
Restricting lending and decreasing risk-weighted assets by asset swaps, e.g. decreasing 
high risk-weighted assets in favour of lower risk-weighted assets, are generally of 
lesser importance than lowering costs and issuing subordinated debt. However, for 
savings banks that have no outstanding subordinated debt, the relevance of instruments 
might be different. Not surprisingly, issuing subordinated debt is a significantly less 
important instrument to increase capital for savings banks without subordinated debt 
than for those with subordinated debt, according to Spearman’s correlation. 
Furthermore, we find that these savings banks would prefer restricting lending over 
issuing subordinated debt. Possibly, the costs of issuing subordinated debt are too 
deterrent for these banks.  
Other potential instruments to increase the capital ratio by increasing the level of 
capital refer to the §340f HGB16 reserves and the equity capital contributions from 
public institutions (e.g. non-participating deposits). The reserves, according to §340f 
HGB, could be used to increase Tier 1 capital, although lowering §340f reserves 
simultaneously means lowering Tier 2 capital. Therefore, this instrument is only 
suitable for the banks that have enough Tier 2 capital but lack Tier 1 capital. However, 
it also requires that there are still enough §340f reserves available. 
Indeed, we find that lowering §340f reserves in order to increase profits is 
significantly more relevant for higher capitalised savings banks with a Tier 1 ratio 
above 7 percent. Probably the lower capitalised savings banks already have intensely 
used this instrument to increase the Tier 1 capital ratio, so that it is of less importance 
now.  
 
                                                 
15  See e.g. Ayuso et al. (2004). 
16  HGB is the abbreviation for Handelsgesetzbuch, the legal basis for German businesses. 
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Table 8: Instruments of managing the capital ratio
Index Index Index Sp.'s
Instrument N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-val.]
Lowering costs 87 3.90 32 3.88 52 3.87 -0.036 [0.749]
Issuance of subordinated debt 87 3.40 32 3.94 52 3.08 -0.305 [0.005]
Restricting lending 85 3.02 31 3.19 51 2.86 -0.125 [0.264]
Decreasing risk-weighted assets by asset swap 87 2.60 32 2.72 52 2.46 -0.113 [0.308]
Lowering §340f reserves to increase retainable profits 84 2.27 31 1.94 50 2.52 0.212 [0.057]
Capital contributions from public institutions 87 2.25 32 2.34 52 2.15 -0.095 [0.393]
Lowering §340f reserves to increase §340g reserves 84 2.19 30 1.93 51 2.31 0.180 [0.109]
Index Index Index Sp.'s
Instrument N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-val.]
Lowering costs 87 3.90 63 4.06 24 3.46 -0.219 [0.041]
Issuance of subordinated debt 87 3.40 63 3.87 24 2.17 -0.511 [0.000]
Restricting lending 85 3.02 62 3.05 23 2.96 -0.024 [0.829]
Decreasing risk-weighted assets by asset swap 87 2.60 63 2.65 24 2.46 -0.073 [0.500]
Lowering §340f reserves to increase retainable profits 84 2.27 62 2.26 22 2.32 0.015 [0.894]
Capital contributions from public institutions 87 2.25 63 2.32 24 2.08 -0.087 [0.422]
Lowering §340f reserves to increase §340g reserves 84 2.19 62 2.03 22 2.64 0.205 [0.062]
Index Index Index Sp.'s
Instrument N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-val.]
Lowering costs 87 3.90 70 3.77 15 4.40 0.255 [0.018]
Issuance of subordinated debt 87 3.40 70 3.37 15 3.67 0.078 [0.481]
Restricting lending 85 3.02 69 2.97 14 3.29 0.092 [0.407]
Decreasing risk-weighted assets by asset swap 87 2.60 70 2.59 15 2.80 0.078 [0.480]
Lowering §340f reserves to increase retainable profits 84 2.27 68 2.19 15 2.73 0.145 [0.190]
Capital contributions from public institutions 87 2.25 70 2.13 15 2.80 0.134 [0.221]
Lowering §340f reserves to increase §340g reserves 84 2.19 68 1.85 15 3.60 0.443 [0.000]
No sub.debtSubord. debt
Tier1<7% Tier1>=7%
§340g reserves
already exist
§340g reserves
do not exist
 
 
§340f reserves may be decreased for two reasons. On the one hand, they might help 
to increase profits in the same year, which means higher retainable profits and thus the 
possibility to increase Tier 1 capital. On the other hand, §340f reserves might be 
converted to §340g reserves, which are the disclosed counterpart of §340f reserves and 
are attributable to Tier 1 capital.  
In general, increasing profits seems to be more important than increasing §340g 
reserves when lowering §340f reserves. All in all, savings banks are rather reluctant to 
create the more transparent reserves according to §340g HGB, since only 18 percent of 
all polled savings banks do have such an item in their balance sheet. Savings banks 
might fear that the §340f reserves could be abolished if all banks should use §340g 
reserves. However, we find that savings banks that already have §340g reserves are 
significantly less reluctant to convert §340f reserves into §340g reserves. Since 
lowering costs is of significantly lower importance for these banks, increasing the 
§340g reserves might be an alternative to lowering costs. Furthermore, we find that 
converting §340f reserves into §340g reserves is a significantly more attractive 
instrument to increase Tier 1 capital for savings banks without outstanding 
subordinated debt. These savings banks might still have enough §340f reserves to 
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lower, since they could do without subordinated debt as an alternative Tier 2 
component so far.  
4.4 The special role of subordinated debt 
Issuing subordinated debt is one of the few alternatives of savings banks for increasing 
the capital ratio. It is heavily used. On average, German savings banks have issued 
subordinated debt amounting to 35 percent of their capital, according to Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2005b).17 Additionally, it has to be taken into account that about 20 
percent of all savings banks have not issued any subordinated debt. 
The results so far suggest that particularly lower capitalised savings banks make use 
of this instrument. In order to support this finding, we examine the motivation behind 
issuing subordinated debt in more detail. Table 9 summarises the results. 
Not surprisingly, the most important motivation behind issuing subordinated debt is 
to increase Tier 2 capital. But other reasons are of high importance as well. Many 
savings banks indicated that preserving a low interest rate level is also an important 
reason for issuing subordinated debt. Funding credit growth, increasing Tier 3 capital 
or the aim to reach the target capital ratio more quickly is of minor importance. 
We find that all listed reasons for issuing subordinated debt are significantly more 
important for lower capitalised savings banks with a Tier 1 ratio below 7 percent than 
for better capitalised banks. However, the difference is particularly pronounced 
regarding the rise of total capital. Therefore, we conclude that particularly lower 
capitalised savings banks make use of subordinated debt to increase capital. These 
banks’ issuance of subordinated debt seems to be strongly influenced by internal 
necessities, whereas better capitalised banks are less forced to issue subordinated debt 
in order to increase total capital. 
Not surprisingly, we find that the motivation to issue subordinated debt significantly 
differs between savings banks that in fact have issued subordinated debt and those that 
have not. These savings banks, without any outstanding subordinated debt, are 
significantly less motivated to issue subordinated debt than other savings banks. 
Nevertheless, the ranking of the individual motivations is generally the same for both 
groups of savings banks. Again, we find that both increasing total capital and 
preserving low interest rates are the main drivers of subordinated debt issuance. 
 
                                                 
17  Deutsche Bundesbank (2005a) defines capital here as the sum of subscribed capital, the reserves, the §340g 
HGB reserves and the subordinated debt. 
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Table 9: Motivation to issue subordinated debt
Index Index Index Sp.'s
Motivation N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-val.]
Increasing total capital 87 2.91 32 3.91 52 2.27 -0.519 [0.000]
Preserving low interest rates 86 2.33 31 2.81 52 2.00 -0.292 [0.007]
Funding desired credit growth 87 1.98 32 2.56 52 1.62 -0.352 [0.001]
Increasing Tier 3 capital 86 1.76 31 2.16 52 1.42 -0.309 [0.005]
Achieving target capital ratio faster 86 1.70 32 2.03 51 1.47 -0.183 [0.098]
Index Index Index Sp.'s
Motivation N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-val.]
Increasing total capital 87 2.91 63 3.47 24 1.42 -0.615 [0.000]
Preserving low interest rates 86 2.33 62 2.63 24 1.54 -0.367 [0.001]
Funding desired credit growth 87 1.98 63 2.22 24 1.33 -0.355 [0.001]
Increasing Tier 3 capital 86 1.76 62 1.94 24 1.29 -0.232 [0.032]
Achieving target capital ratio faster 86 1.70 62 1.87 24 1.25 -0.239 [0.027]
Index Index Index Sp.'s
N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-val.]
Funding desired credit growth 87 1.98 10 1.60 77 2.03 0.145 [0.180]
Index Index Index Sp.'s
N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-val.]
Achieving target capital ratio faster 86 1.70 40 2.13 45 1.33 -0.305 [0.005]
Index Index Index Sp.'s
N mean N mean N mean corr. [P-val.]
Increasing Tier 3 capital 86 1.76 23 1.43 63 1.87 0.184 [0.091]
Handelsbuch- No Handels-
institut buchinstitut
Quantitative No quantitative
capital target capital target
High credit Low credit
growth growth
No sub.debtSubord. debt
Tier1>=7%Tier1<7%
 
 
Funding desired credit growth by issuing subordinated debt might be especially 
important for savings banks with high credit growth. Therefore, we explicitly 
differentiated between savings banks with a credit growth below and above average. 
However, we do not find that these savings banks with a high credit growth are in need 
of subordinated debt to fund their credit growth. The index means of both groups 
suggest rather that the savings banks with high credit growth need subordinated debt to 
a lesser extent than other banks. Therefore, we obtain evidence that high credit growth 
is only targeted if savings banks can fund their high credit growth internally.  
Furthermore, we find that achieving the target capital growth faster by issuing 
subordinated debt is significantly more relevant for the savings banks that in fact have 
a quantitative capital target. Especially the latter banks thus consciously use 
subordinated debt as an instrument to reach their optimal quantitative capital ratio. 
Finally, we examined whether issuing subordinated debt as a means to increase Tier 
3 capital is more important for Handelsbuchinstitute than other banks. Specific short-
term subordinated debt might be assigned to Tier 3 capital, which is needed by 
Handelsbuchinstitute in order to underlay their market risk. However, we do not find 
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that these savings banks, especially, issue subordinated debt in order to increase Tier 3 
capital. In contrast, Spearman’s correlation indicates that Handelsbuchinstitute are 
even less reliant on subordinated debt as an instrument to increase Tier 3 capital than 
other banks. Since Handelsbuchinstitute are somewhat better capitalised according to 
Table 4, they might strongly resort to capped Tier 2 capital instead of subordinated 
debt in order to underlay their market risk. 
4.5 Capital policy and legal changes 
Until July 2005, the local authorities, as the responsible bodies of the public savings 
banks, had to guarantee all third party liabilities of the savings banks. Due to these 
guarantees, savings banks were able to fund themselves very favourably by issuing 
debt. However, since these guarantees were regarded as ineligible subventions by the 
EU, they were abolished by July 2005, although a transitional period until 2015 was 
acknowledged. 
Due to these legal changes, the savings banks might be forced to defend their 
highest rating class by improving their capital endowment. Table 10 summarises the 
potential effect of the reduced public guarantees on the savings banks target capital 
ratio. 
 
Table 10: Influence of reduced public guarantees on the target capital ratio
Index Index Index
N mean N mean N mean
Reduced public guarantees 87 2.37 32 2.63 52 2.29
(Anstaltslast/Gewährträgerhaftung)
Spearman's correlation
[P-value]
-0.132
[0.232]
Tier1<7% Tier1>=7%
 
 
The savings banks were asked to assess the potential effect on their target capital 
ratio on a scale ranging from 1 (no effect) to 5 (very strong effect). The index mean is 
just the mean of the declared magnitude of the effect. Therefore, the mean of 2.37 for 
all surveyed savings banks represents a small to moderate effect on the savings banks. 
Especially lower capitalised savings banks might be forced to increase their capital 
ratio due to the reduction in public guarantees. However, differentiating for lower and 
higher capitalised savings banks reveals a remarkable, but not significant effect of 
these legal changes on the savings banks’ behaviour. Both savings banks with a Tier 1 
capital ratio below and above seven percent intend to moderately increase their total 
capital ratio because of the reductions in the public guarantees. 
The future changes in the minimum capital requirements of banks, according to the 
new Basel II proposal, are expected to have a considerable impact on the capital 
management of savings banks as well. We expect that the impact on the savings 
bank’s target capital ratio depends on the approach that the savings bank intends to 
apply. The standardised, the IRB foundation and the IRB advanced approach are 
increasing in complexity. However, since the banks’ risk components are increasingly 
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measured more accurately, these approaches might increasingly allow the banks to 
hold less capital for a given risk exposure.18 Therefore, savings banks applying more 
complex approaches might even be allowed to hold less capital than before.  
According to Table 11, the majority of savings banks will not change their Tier 2 
capital endowment due to Basel II. However, 31 percent of the savings banks indicated 
that these regulatory changes will make them increase Tier 2 capital and a single 
savings bank even declared that it will decrease Tier 2 capital due to Basel II. 
Particularly lower capitalised savings banks might be forced to increase their Tier 2 
capital because of the new capital accord, since their financial scope is smaller. Indeed, 
we find that 41 percent of all lower capitalised savings banks intend to increase the 
Tier 2 endowment due to Basel II, whereas only 27 percent of the higher capitalised 
savings banks intend to do so. However, these differences are not significant.  
We also distinguish the effect of Basel II according to the various Basel II 
approaches the savings banks intend to apply. Although applying more sophisticated 
approaches theoretically should result in smaller minimum capital requirements,19 the 
real effect is less clear. According to the results of the third quantitative impact study 
(QIS 3), minimum capital requirements, on average, will presumably increase by 12 
percent for large German banks applying the standardised approach and 15.5 percent 
for banks choosing the IRB foundation approach. In the case of small German banks, 
however, minimum capital requirements will increase by 0.2 percent for banks 
applying the standardised approach and decrease by 9.6 percent for banks choosing the 
IRB foundation approach.20 
Sorting our survey results by the intended Basel II approaches, however, indicates 
no significant difference in the capital changes dependent on the various approaches. 
Nevertheless, we found that the share of savings banks that will increase Tier 2 capital 
due to Basel II is a bit higher for savings banks applying the IRB foundation approach. 
More of these banks probably would have had to increase their capital ratio if they had 
chosen the standardised approach instead of the IRB foundation approach.  
We obtain an insignificant difference as well, when differentiating between both 
Handelsbuchinstitute and other savings banks. We expected that Handelsbuchinstitute 
might prefer a more complex approach. The banks with a high market risk could 
particularly benefit from lower capital requirements related to more complex 
approaches, and, they are more likely to have the know-how to apply these 
approaches.  
 
                                                 
18  See Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (2004), Tz. 14. 
19  See Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (2001), Tz. 13. 
20  See Deutsche Bundesbank (2003). 
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Table 11: Influence of Basel II on the target capital ratio
Decreasing No effect Increasing Index Sp.'s
capital (%) (%) capital (%) mean N corr. [P-val.]
Consequences of Basel II 1.1 67.8 31.0 2.30 87
Results for subsamples:
... Tier1 ratio<7% 3.1 56.3 40.6 2.38 32
... Tier1 ratio>=7% 0.0 73.1 26.9 2.27 52 -0.117 [0.288]
... Choosing Stand. app. 0.0 72.0 28.0 2.28 50
... Choosing IRB found. app. 3.0 63.6 33.3 2.30 33 0.068 [0.540]
... Handelsbuchinstitut 4.3 65.2 30.4 2.26 23
... No Handelsbuchinstitut 0.0 68.8 31.3 2.31 64 0.036 [0.742]  
 
5 Conclusions 
We surveyed 87 German savings banks on their management of capital. In contrast to 
earlier studies, our paper focuses on German public savings banks, which are unique 
worldwide, since they have very special institutional characteristics. They are public 
corporations, whose access to the capital market is restricted. Therefore, they heavily 
rely on retained earnings. One of the very few alternatives to increase capital, besides 
retaining profits, is to issue subordinated debt. 
We find that 47 percent of all savings banks target a quantitative target capital ratio. 
This result is in line with the trade-off theory of capital, which states that a specific 
optimal capital ratio exists. Interestingly, these savings banks target both lower and 
higher capital targets, whereas other savings banks with a qualitative capital target 
only wish to increase or maintain the capital ratio, but not to reduce it. Since their 
capitalisation does not differ significantly, we conclude that the banks aiming at a 
quantitative capital ratio have a more complex capital management.  
In line with this finding, we obtain evidence that the savings banks, with a 
quantitative capital target, are more likely to choose a more complex Basel II 
approach. However, larger savings banks also prefer more complicated Basel II 
approaches, since large savings banks are more likely to have the willingness and 
abilities to apply more sophisticated approaches. 
The savings banks’ target capital ratio is particularly determined by the savings 
banks’ willingness to take risk, the desired credit growth and profitability. In order to 
reach the target capital ratio, instruments that manipulate the level of capital are 
preferred to instruments that increase the level of risk-weighted assets. The most 
important instruments are lowering costs and issuing subordinated debt. We find that 
the issuance of subordinated debt is significantly more important to savings banks with 
a Tier 1 ratio below 7 percent. For these banks, issuing subordinated debt is even the 
most important instrument to increase capital. We find that particularly lower 
capitalised savings banks have issued subordinated debt. 
Examining the issuance of subordinated debt in more detail, we ascertain that the 
most important motivation behind issuing subordinated debt is to increase Tier 2 
capital. This motivation is significantly more relevant for less capitalised savings 
banks with a Tier 1 ratio below 7 percent. Preserving low interest rates on the capital 
 
21
market is an additional important motivation behind issuing subordinated debt. Of 
little relevance is the aim to reach the target capital ratio faster. However, this 
motivation is significantly more relevant for savings banks targeting a quantitative 
capital ratio. 
About 60 percent of all surveyed savings banks plan to apply the simplest, the 
standardised approach under Basel II, whereas about 40 percent will apply the IRB 
foundation approach. However, the consequences of Basel II on the capital ratio are 
limited. Independent of the selected approach, the majority of savings banks in both 
groups will not increase capital due to the new capital agreement. Furthermore, the 
abolishment of the public guarantees regarding all third party liabilities of the savings 
banks in July 2005 will affect the savings banks’ capital endowment only moderately. 
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